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TRADE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
Interest Structures in
Two-Level Games

ran_ C Ohien-pin Li

The United States in the 1980s became more aggressive
in calling for market liberalization through bilateral or regional negotiations
with its trading partners. In contrast to traditional protectionism, which

shielded domestic industries from foreign competition by way of import restriction, the new approach emphasized export expansion. Along with trade
liberalization, Section 301 of the Trade Act (1974) was strengthened in 1984
and 1988, giving the president wider authority and discretion in dealing with

"unjustifiable" or "discriminatory" foreign trade practices.
Against this background, the Reagan administration initiated a series of

trade talks with the United States's principal trading partners on marketopening measures. The ramifications of these trade talks, however, extend
beyond the simple idea of regulating imports or exports. Trade negotiations
often impact the interests of powerful economic sectors on both sides, and

directly or indirectly affect a government's broader objectives such as employment, economic growth, and welfare distribution. They stimulate interest groups that are much more muted on other international negotiations, and

the competition of those opposing interests and policy goals, either within the
economies or between them, creates an intricate dilemma for the negotiators,
who try to maintain balance amid the diverse forces. Frequently, the negotiation process involves extensive tradeoffs of various political-economic interests in the nexus of domestic and foreign contexts-a subject of significant
theoretical import in economics and politics.

Chien-pin Li is Associate Professor of Political Science, Kennesaw

State College, Marietta, Georgia. He wishes to thank Edward J. Miller, John E. Morser, and

Dennis D. Riley for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
C 1994 by The Regents of the University of California
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This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and processes underlying trade negotiations by examining a typical case: the trade talks between

the United States and Taiwan. Since the mid-1970s, trade between the two
countries has expanded, and especially since the early 1980s with the balance
consistently in favor of Taiwan. With its immense foreign reserves-second
only to Japan's in the late 1980s-and its huge trade surplus with the U.S.,
Taiwan became one of the natural targets for the new American policy.

Under the Reagan administration, a series of negotiations were conducted
aiming to redress the trade imbalance through bilateral arrangements.
In analyzing the complexity of the interest competition in the negotiations,

the pluralist perspective is used as the article's theoretical model. Conven-

tional wisdom of the pluralist perspective argues that a government's policies
and positions in foreign economic affairs basically reflect the distribution of
power or preferences among domestic groups. The holding or rejecting of
specific foreign economic policy positions is a function of domestic pressure
politics, and is played out between the official representatives and the various
social or bureaucratic groups related to the issues in dispute.
This perspective has been further expanded by Robert Putnam, who developed a two-level game metaphor to examine the interactions of domestic

politics and international pressures in bilateral negotiations.' According to
Putnam, a set of intertwined domestic and international negotiations exist in
which it is impossible to reach agreement in an international negotiation

without some kind of overlapped "win-sets"-that is, the sets of all possible
international arrangements that are acceptable to the domestic constituents of

both sides. For Putnam, the size of the "win-set" depends primarily on domestic institutions and structures, although in some cases these factors may
be subject to manipulation by the negotiators. Two of the factors are most
pertinent to this study: the distribution of constituent preferences and the

participation of organized interests.
The distribution of preferences might vary with issues, whose potential to
split a society can be quite different. For instance, issues such as the promotion of a country's exports, which expands its economy and wealth but has no

adverse effects on other domestic sectors, are less likely to raise domestic
controversies. On these "homogeneous" issues, domestic constituents share
similar preferences and enjoy a high degree of consensus. In such cases, to

maximize the chance of domestic ratification of the negotiated agreements,
negotiators tend to follow a hard-bargain, "the more, the better" approach,

which in fact reduces the size of the win-set. Conversely, when constituent

preferences are more heterogeneous-when international agreements might
1. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game,"

International Organization, no. 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.
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have uneven domestic effects-negotiators may find that some of their own
people become the "silent allies" of their opponents. In these cases, the pres-

ence of transnational coalitions will moderate the negotiators' positions and
expand their win-sets; consequently, it becomes easier to reach an international agreement.

The participation of organized interests in the negotiation process will also
affect the size of the win-set. When the costs/benefits of negotiations are
relatively concentrated on a few sectors or when issues are highly politicized,

the interests concerned will mobilize to defend their well-being. Their active

participation in the process then minimizes the autonomy of the negotiators,
limits the negotiators' maneuvering space, and reduces the size of the winset. Hence, negotiations that are highly politicized on both sides tend to end
in stalemate.

In a way, this two-level metaphor represents an effort to predict negotiating strategies and behaviors from different situations of "intra-organizational

bargaining."2 Presumably, negotiations are most difficult in cases of high
interest homogeneity and mobilization, for they generate the least win-sets.
The situation then improves when domestic interests become diverse and/or
unorganized. The following analysis applies Putnam's theoretical perspec-

tive to trade negotiations between the U.S. and Taiwan, showing the interrelationship between domestic interest structures and the negotiation processes.

U.S.-Taiwan Trade Negotiations
Table 1 lists the U.S.-Taiwan trade negotiations in the 1980s, which dealt
with a wide variety of subjects and problems. Based on the two concepts

discussed by Putnam, interest homogeneity and interest mobilization, these
trade issues can be grouped into three categories.3 The first includes issues

that, for both the U.S. and Taiwan, score high on the homogeneity and mobilization scales. Here, the distribution of domestic preferences is generally ho-

mogeneous, with no significant internal splits over bargaining positions.
Also, interest groups are quite active in these negotiations. All the talks on
intellectual property rights (IPR) and agricultural issues (i.e., fruits, turkey,

duck, rice, cigarettes, wine, and driftnet fishing) fall into this category.

The second group contains the issues marked by heterogeneous interests
and quiet lobbying. For both the U.S. and Taiwan, there are internal dis2. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 281.
3. Negotiations on free trade area and the trade dispute settlement mechanism are excluded
from this study. These issues were initiated by Taiwan but since they might imply de facto

recognition of Taiwan's political status, they are considered political rather than trade issues.

Although these issues were repeatedly put on the agenda, both sides pursued them only halfheartedly and obtained no meaningful results.
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TABLE 1 Major Trade Talks Between the U.S. and Taiwan, 1981-1989
Issue

Date*

Agreement

Signed

Trade talk 1981 Trade agreement
Fishing 1982 Fishing agreement
1987-89 Fishing agreement

Textile 1982 Textile agreement
1983-88

Rice

1983-84

Rice agreement
1985-89

Wine, beer, cigarettes 1984-86
1984-86 Wine, beer, and
1988-89 cigarettes agreement

Intellectual property right 1984-89 Copyright protection
agreement

Leasing

1985

Free trade area 1985-88
Investment 1985-86
Insurance

1985-89

Motion pictures 1985-86
Machine tools 1986 Machine tools VRA
1987-89

Steel

1986
1987-88

Trade dispute settlement 1986-87
mechanism

Turkey 1986; 1988 Turkey agreement
Transportation 1986-87
Banking 1986; 1988-89
Fruits
*

Date

1988
opens

recorded.

when

Talks

agreements,

talk

begin

following

but

an

they

discussed below, interest groups generally take a low profile in the process.

Generally speaking, negotiations on service industries (banking, insurance,
investment, leasing, transportation) fit quite well with these features. Issues
in the third category are related to Taiwan's exports (or American imports),
including textiles, steel, and machine tools, that can be summed up as "manu-
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facture issues." On these, the degree of interest homogeneity is high for Taiwan but low for the U.S.; on the other hand, the participation rates of the
interest groups show that organized interests are active in the U.S. but quiet
in Taiwan.

Comparing the patterns of negotiating behaviors/strategies in these three

types of issues will allow us to understand their variations due to underlying
differences in preference distribution and interest mobilization.
Agricultural-IPR Issues

Generally speaking, Taiwan usually took a "legalistic" negotiating approach
on agricultural issues to command the high moral ground. In the face of
strong American market-opening pressures, its negotiators directly chal-

lenged the legitimacy of these demands by citing American protectionist
practices. They argued that the indecision of the Uruguay Round and the
various protectionist practices in the U.S., Japan, and the European Commu-

nity, all indicated the dubious and fragmentary nature of agricultural trade
regimes-that is, that the nonexistence of universal rules and the existence of
American protectionism spoke against the legitimacy of American market-

opening demands.4 This attitude was also evident in the public remarks of

some ranking economic officials. For instance, in a legislative interpellation
session in April 1988, Vice-Economic Minister Chien-Shien Wang said that

Taiwan would by no means make concessions to the U.S. on agricultural

products. He further warned that the government would not extend its rice
agreement with the U.S., not because of its economic impact on Taiwan's

rice exports, but because of its "unfair" nature.5
On driftnet fishing, Taiwan took a similar legalistic approach, declining for
reasons of national sovereignty to grant Americans the right to visit its vessels to verify fishing violations. On the matter of copyright protection (IPR),
Taiwan used the provisions of the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention

(UCC) to question the appropriateness of the American proposal, which had
allegedly integrated the UCC with the 1886 Bern Convention on a selective
basis to maximize protection. Also, the U.S. demand to protect copyrights
retroactively was first turned down by Taiwan on the ground that retroactivity
contradicted the general legal principle.
American negotiators, on the other hand, usually sidestepped these legal-

ity/fairness arguments, approaching the issues from an economic cost/benefit

perspective. They maintained that American turkey and fruit exports to Tai4. Information is compiled from Wo Kuo Twei Wai Mao I Tsu Shang Tan Pan Chi Yao (Sum-

mary of foreign trade consultations and negotiations) (Taipei: Ministry of Economics, various
years).

5. United Daily News (Taipei), April 22, 1988.

This content downloaded from 130.218.13.44 on Wed, 21 Sep 2016 12:53:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CHIEN-PIN LI 697

wan would not be major problems for Taiwanese farmers since their market
shares were minimal. They also reviewed fundamental problems of Taiwan-

ese agriculture, especially involving fruit and dairy farming, concluding that
American products would not hurt the farmers as much as Taiwan's climate,

soil, inefficient marketing-distribution structure, and overproduction.6 In addition, they asked, if the rice agreement had not impaired Taiwan's rice ex-

ports, why wouldn't the Taiwan government simply renew it? Even the complicated legal discussion on IPR was coated with economic incentives.
American negotiators argued that given Taiwan's recent strength in foreign

investment and technological innovation, Taiwanese companies would actually benefit from strong legal protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights.

There are plenty of examples of this kind of legalistic vs. economic exchange in negotiation records but it seemed that these arguments were used
by both sides simply to defend and justify their predetermined positions. Negotiations on the agricultural-IPR issues were the most controversial and confrontational; true dialogue did not seem to exist, and few compromises were

made following the exchanges. The negotiating processes were marked by
rigidness and inflexibility, and the uncompromising attitudes of the negotia-

tors often led to deadlocks. In Putnam's terms, these are the negotiations in
which there are no overlapping win-sets.

The stalemates and the inability to reach agreement are indicated by the
frequency of American threats and coercion, with trade disputes turned into
economic showdowns. In virtually all of the agri-IPR negotiations, the
Americans resorted to threats to invoke Section 301 or similar retaliations to
press for concessions from Taiwan. Such intensity was not seen in the other

two issue groups. In retrospect, the uncompromising behavior of both sides

correlated with their domestic interest politics. Politicized issues, mobilized
interest groups, and the homogeneous preference distributions significantly

diminished the negotiators' discretionary space, hence reducing their winsets.

Taiwan's agricultural sector, comprising 17% of the labor force, had been

coopted by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party since the early 1970s, but in

the 1980s the farmers, who had traditionally been passive and acquiescent,

began to protest the influx of foreign agricultural products. In May 1988 a
series of protests culminated in a massive and somewhat violent demonstra-

tion against imported turkey and fruits. The farmers' dissatisfaction with current agricultural policies, bolstered by the opposition party's organizational

6. These arguments were seen in a statement issued by the American Institute on Taiwan
(AIT), the de facto American embassy, March 16, 1988.
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and logistical support, nibbled at the KMT's traditional political advantage in
rural areas and raised concerns within the party.

The farmers' problems were well publicized by the media, invoking a good
deal of sympathy from the general public. Opening the market to American

farm products was frequently portrayed as yielding to imperialist pressures.
For example, during the talks on American cigarette imports, Taiwan's media
described the negotiations as the second Opium War. It also perceived al-

lowing inspection of Taiwan's fishing vessels as an intrusion on national sovereignty, and said that Taiwan could become a U.S. cultural colony under the

proposed copyright law revisions. Against this backdrop, agri-IPR negotia-

tions were not viewed as purely economic issues, as American delegates

might have portrayed them. Once politicized, trade issues are transformed by
emotion and nationalism into matters of prestige and dignity, and concessions

can easily be interpreted as a national humiliation brought about by an incompetent government. Thus, Taiwan negotiators lost their autonomy and
were severely constrained by domestic societal factors, making it difficult to
take a more conciliatory approach.7
The American negotiators also faced strong farm lobbies. National organizations such as the Rice Millers Association, the National Turkey Federation,
and the Tobacco Institute, as well as regional organizations from states such
as Florida, California, and Washington were very active in the agricultural

talks. They repeatedly testified at public hearings on Taiwan's rice exports
and on cigarette, wine, fruit, and turkey imports, and openly advocated American retaliation if their demands were not met. Similarly, publishing, pharmaceutical, and movie companies were active in the IPR negotiations. These
organizations mobilized congressional support to pressure Taiwan to open its
markets, and hired legal consultants who monitored Taiwan's policies and
kept American officials informed. Agents from these organized interests

maintained close contact with government officials throughout the negotia-

tions, on several occasions even exercising a veto power by rejecting working
drafts and forcing both sides to reopen negotiations. Their assertiveness and

determination limited the kind of concessions that the American negotiators
were able to make.

The intransigence on both sides was further reinforced by homogeneous

interest structures. For the United States, the promotion of agricultural ex-

ports and protection of American intellectual property rights incur no domes-

tic costs, for no social groups will be hurt by the pursuit of these policies. In
Taiwan, the government's positions on agri-IPR issues were not directly chal-

7. Yao-tung Chao, chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, took

note of the situation and asked the public to separate emotionalism from the real issues (China
Post (Taipei), August 26, 1986).
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lenged by any domestic groups either, partly due to Taiwan's politicized nationalism and partly because of inactivity by the large number of unmobilized

consumers, the real beneficiaries of the open market. As a result, high-interest homogeneity justified and reinforced the lobbying efforts of agricultural
groups in both countries.

Taken together, the U.S.-Taiwan agri-IPR negotiations resemble "distributive bargaining" in which negotiators, viewing the bargaining structure as a

zero-sum game, are reluctant to make concessions.8 The intransigence is
manifested in such competitive bargaining behavior as warning, bluffing, and

threatening. The behavior in these negotiations can indeed be attributed to

the characteristics of the issues-high interest homogeneity and strong societal penetration-which create an environment highly adverse to reaching
agreement. As no compromise or concession was obtained in the process,

agri-IPR negotiations often reached a stalemate.
However, as pressure from the dissatisfied farm sector continued to mount,
American negotiators were forced to use coercive tactics to break the bar-

gaining deadlock. Interestingly, each time the Section 301 threat was used, it

effectively changed the dynamics of the process by transforming Taiwan's
domestic interest structure from homogeneity to heterogeneity. The cigarette
and wine talks in 1986 illustrate this point. After several unsuccessful negoti-

ations, the U.S. declared that if Taiwan continued to shut out American cigarettes and wine from its market, then Taiwan' s footwear, textiles, or

computer exports would be targets for 301 retaliation. Not surprisingly, the
announcement stirred apprehension, even panic in Taiwan's export sectors

which, unwilling to be sacrificed for the cigarette and wine industries,
launched their own lobby to persuade the government to accept the American

demands.9 Thus, the effect of the 301 threat was to transform an international dispute into a domestic one, with Taiwan's export sector competing
with its agricultural sector and putting the Taiwan authorities in the awkward
position of having to choose between them.

Although the hardliners still preferred no concession, the effective
counterlobby from the export sectors-the economic lifeline of Taiwan's export-oriented economy-eventually gained the upper hand. Taiwan finally

gave in and signed the cigarette and wine act. As noted earlier, the U.S.
repeated the 301 threat in ensuing agricultural talks whenever negotiations

led nowhere, and each time Taiwan modified its positions and made lastminute concessions. The powerful effect of the threat can be explained from
the perspective of the newly created heterogeneous interest structure.

8. Walton and McKersie, A Behavioral Theory, p. 11.
9. United Daily News, October 18, 1986.
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Service Issues
The rigidness and inflexibility observed on agricultural issues occur less
often in negotiations over banking, insurance, and transportation in which
Taiwan seems to have adopted a middle-of-the-road strategy with a delicate

balance between acquiescence and defiance. Unlike the outright confrontation in the agri-IPR talks, Taiwan's negotiators on service issues have ac-

cepted some American propositions and made adjustments accordingly;

however, they do delay decisions on questions of great controversy or importance.

These incremental concessions can be seen in a series of market-opening

measures taken by Taiwan in service sectors since 1985. Under American
pressure, Taiwan granted foreign banks short-term credit to meet minimum
reserve requirements (March 1985), allowed foreign banks to join the central-

ized debit card processing facility (August 1986), extended the limit on time
deposits from six months to three years (October 1986), permitted foreign

banks to open a second branch in Kaohsiung (October 1986), and allowed
them to sell foreign gold coins (April 1988). However, it still maintained
tight controls over more sensitive areas such as the type of investments and
loans that foreign banks can make and their ability to influence Taiwan's
currency market.

In the case of insurance, Taiwan agreed in April 1987 to grant licenses to
qualified U.S. insurance companies but restricted the number of licenses is-

sued each year to four and the kinds of business in which these companies
can engage (two for life and two for nonlife insurance). In addition, American insurers were not allowed to invest in the local stock or real estate markets on the ground that the influx of their capital might destabilize the small
local markets. In transportation, Taiwan allowed U.S. carriers to operate as

their own container terminal operators, shipping agencies, and sea cargo forwarders but retained its ban on foreign ownership of trucking operations,
which was considered by Taiwan as a national security issue that might affect
its ability to mobilize troops and resources during wartime. Taken together,
incrementalism characterized Taiwan's bargaining behavior in these issue negotiations.
A similar middle-of-the-road approach was adopted by the American nego-

tiators. The United States, though preferring a clearer, more comprehensive
timetable of liberalization, often settled for Taiwan's incremental concessions. Each time, American negotiators went home with Taiwan's promises

of change in some minor areas, but they would come back and continue to
negotiate the yet unresolved parts, which usually meant winning other con-

cessions. For the U.S., steady improvement, even if slow, meant progress
and a precedent that could be cited to persuade other states elsewhere.
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The pursuit of incremental changes by both sides can be explained by the

lack of interest mobilization in the service sectors. On these issues, the societal inputs and constraints on both sides played a far less important role than in

the agri-IPR negotiations. In Taiwan no nationalistic emotion had been inflamed, and not many private interest groups mobilized to speak for their well

being. In other words, there was not much participation from the civil society
in the service negotiations.

Industries such as banking, insurance, and securities have been heavily
regulated and closely watched by the Taiwan government for their potential

destabilizing effects on financial markets. There were no private banks in
Taiwan during the time of this study; all were owned and managed by the

public sector with executives appointed by the provincial or central government. This control over the source of capital ensured government leadership
in the financial sector. Although the securities and insurance industries are

not as tightly controlled, private companies are balanced by those owned by

the government. State dominance is also observed in transportation and communication. On transportation issues, the affected targets-the Kaohsiung
and Keelung Harbor Bureaus-are government agencies subordinate to the
administrative control of the Ministry of Communications. The government

also has monopolistic control of port, railroad, and telecommunication systems.

Given its comprehensive and complete control of these sectors, the govern-

ment does not leave much room for interest groups to organize or maneuver.
The conventional view of Taiwan's "strong state-weak society" fits quite
well in this issue category. The strong state and weak private groups, how-

ever, do not add up to a homogeneous interest structure. Within the government itself, disagreements abound. In fact, most of the internal policy
debates and discussions were marked by bureaucratic competition.
Taiwan's financial-monetary authority has a reputation for policy inertia,

and is inclined to reject all American demands for change. On the other

hand, the Ministry of Economics is more sympathetic to free trade ideas that
can streamline and modernize Taiwan's economic structures, and the Minis-

try of Foreign Affairs generally emphasizes the importance of maintaining a
friendly Taiwan-U.S. relationship. Consequently, incrementalism, which accommodates some of the American demands but buys more time and breathing space for Taiwan, was the product of internal bureaucratic compromise in

this kind of heterogeneous interest structure. In the absence of social penetration, this easily becomes official policy.
On the other hand, the societal pressure exerted on American negotiators

was not as strong as that in the agri-IPR issues. The banks, insurance corporations, or other multinationals that want to open Taiwan's service market did
not embark on such intensive aggressive lobbying. Banking and insurance
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multinationals, supported by national organizations such as American Bank-

ers Association and American Insurance Association, did express their discontent with Taiwan's discriminatory measures but they tended to keep a low
profile. When making complaints, they would contact Taiwan's authority

directly through local channels such as the American Chamber of Commerce
in Taipei or American Institute in Taiwan rather than looking for high level
pressure from the U.S. administration or Congress. This approach might be

partially explained by the features of their business. Unlike selling products,
service industries must keep a physical presence, follow local regulations,
and transact regular business with the host society, making the maintenance

of a long-term cooperative relationship a better strategy. The more patient
and moderate postures of the business groups exonerated the American negotiators from too much societal pressure and allowed them to have more control in the talks.

Moreover, interest distributions in service issues are not entirely homogeneous in the United States. Although opening Taiwan's service market is a
desirable goal, American negotiators do not want to press the issues too hard.
They acknowledge that a sudden massive restructuring of Taiwan's service

industries, especially for those in the financial sector, might disrupt the island's whole financial system, possibly destabilizing the political balance.

Thus, their concern in maintaining Taiwan as a stable force in East Asia
complicates their interest calculations and helps moderate their positions and

demands. 10
To summarize, the much more accommodating and responsive behavior on

both sides in the service negotiations can be explained by their domestic in-

terest patterns. In the absence of penetration by interest groups in the negotiating process, negotiators enjoy greater freedom to adjust or modify their
positions in searching for acceptable compromises in a somewhat heterogeneous bureaucratic structure. This explains why the 301 retaliation threat was

used only once by the U.S. amid so many intricate problems.
Manufacture Issues

During the time-span of this study, the U.S. asked Taiwan to add steel,
machine tool, and the long-standing textile issues to the agenda and to negoti-

ate voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs). In contrast to what it did in the
agri-IPR issues, Taiwan did not seriously question the U.S. about the legality
or legitimacy of the agenda. Instead, it accepted the quota/VRAs frameworks

as given, while concentrating on the technical aspects of these issues.
Taiwan's major concerns in manufacture negotiations were such specific
items as how to estimate market share of the base year, how to reduce the
10. Interview with an official of the U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C., June 1990.
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types of products regulated by quota, and how to enhance the flexibility of
transferring unused quotas between different categories or different years.
Categories, quotas, growth rates, carry-over and carry-forward ratios constituted the core of the negotiations. All kinds of numbers in hundreds of different products made the manufacture negotiations replete with statistical
information. Taiwan's negotiators were competent to master these technicalities, and staff would stay late during negotiating sessions to crunch numbers
and look for data that best served their arguments and interests. In cases of
disagreement over export-import accounts, they were able to pick up Ameri-

can statistical mistakes and present accurate convincing evidence on data and
accounts. In these issues, their efforts paid off by having American customs
return wrongly detained "overshipment" quotas.

This technicality-oriented strategy is made possible by the features of the
interest structures in Taiwan. For all the manufacture issues, Taiwan's interest distributions are relatively homogeneous. The promotion of exports is

important to its export-oriented economy and undermines no one's interest.

This homogeneity reinforces the traditional cooperation and coordination between the government and the export sectors. Industry representatives fre-

quently joined Taiwan's delegations in trade talks and provided relevant
information; they were especially useful in examining statistical records,

which gave a special edge to Taiwan's negotiators in mastering the technicalities.

However, it is the state not the organized interests that controls and dominates this kind of government-industry linkage. For Taiwan's government,

the power to distribute quotas and issue export licenses in textiles and
machine tools adds to its strength in dealing with industries. In the case of
steel, Taiwan's biggest producer, the China Steel Co., is owned by the gov-

ernment. Hence, Taiwan's manufacturing sectors are quite dependent on the

government, which generally controls the direction of manufacture negotiations. It is the government, not the industries, that makes the final decision
about whose interests to protect or what kind of concessions to make. While

the government will do its best to aid Taiwan's industries, when concessions
are necessary and inevitable, the industries will accept the government's
judgment.

In contrast to Taiwan's technical approach in these negotiations, the U.S.
seemed more interested in the formality and symbolism of the issues. Tai-

wan's willingness to accept U.S. protectionist goals is a visible policy to
American domestic manufacturers and other trading partners, satisfying the
political needs of the U.S. administration. In exchange, American negotiators
are willing to compromise on less visible aspects such as more flexible categorization and application of quotas. For example, the U.S. agreed not to

bind Taiwan with a formal agreement on steel as long as the latter promised
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TABLE 2 Issue Characteristics and Bargaining Strategies of the U.S. and Taiwan

Service Manufacture
Agri-IPR Issues Issues Issues
Interest

homogeneity Taiwan: high then low low high
U.S.:

high

low

low

Societal

penetration Taiwan: high low low
U.S.: high low high
Strategies Taiwan: legalistic incremental technical
U.S.: economic incremental formality

to exert reasonable self-restraint. Taiwan also reaped real benefits on textile
issues by making some symbolic concessions. For instance, in 1987 the U.S.

agreed to extend the bilateral textile agreement and double Taiwan's growth
rate in exchange for Taiwan's reduction of tariffs on textiles. Given Tai-

wan's competitiveness in this area, the tariff reduction was more symbolic
than real.

The two contrasting approaches (technicality vis-a-vis formality) are essentially complementary and enable both sides to make give-and-take exchanges. But why would the U.S. exchange some substantive benefits for

symbolic reasons? The answer can be found in its interest patterns: strong
societal penetration in a heterogeneous interest structure. The importwracked industries such as textiles and steel have long been actively looking

for trade protection. Coordinated by national organizations such as the
American Textile Manufacturers Institute or the American Iron and Steel Institute, the industries have frequently made dumping charges, sought import
relief, and pushed for protectionist legislation. They often appeal to nationalistic feelings by pointing to the economic damage and social dislocation created by foreign competition.

Their efforts, however, have encountered intensive counterlobbying from
other trade-dependent groups. Consumer groups, importers, and retailers are

strongly opposed to protectionist measures that might directly or indirectly
harm them. Sometimes, these trade-dependent groups even forge transna-

tional coalitions with foreign industries to undercut protectionist efforts and
emphasize the economic benefits of the market mechanism and free trade.
These heterogeneous interests and cross-cutting pressures from proprotection
and antiprotection groups put the U.S. government in a unique position as
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mediator between the conflicting interests. The strong but contradicting soci-

etal inputs limit the choices that the administration can make, forcing it to
maintain a balance between the conflicting goals of economic nationalism
and free trade.
The formality-oriented bargaining approach reflects the American negotia-

tors' strategy to solve this dilemma. The U.S. would concede the nationalistic argument by pushing for broader frames of protectionism (the quota and
VRA systems) but simultaneously retain some free trade ideas by making

substantive concessions to its trading partners, and indirectly to some domestic groups, on technical grounds. It was the only way in which negotiators

could reconcile the domestic heterogeneous interests.
Taken together (see Table 2), bargaining behaviors/strategies disclose distinctive patterns in the three types of trade negotiations. The styles-ranging
from outright confrontation in the agri-IPR issues to the practical incre-

mentalism of the service talks-can be explained by the different combinations of interest distribution (homogeneity vs. heterogeneity) and mobilization (active vs. inactive). The conditions of the agri-IPR issues-high interest homogeneity and mobilization-minimize the negotiators' maneuvering

space and encourage aggressive and competitive bargaining. On the other
hand, situations in service and manufacture areas are more congenial to mutual coordination and compromise.

The findings in this case study suggest that the interplay of competing
political-economic forces in domestic and foreign settings in trade negotiations may show different patterns on different issues, depending on their interest alignment. Further exploration of the linkage between issues and
bargaining behavior merits attention as international trade negotiations can
only be understood in the context of the different configurations of domestic
pressure politics.
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